A 100-Year History of Shipbuilding

01Why There Are Three Rulers for Counting Ships

A ship usually hits the water 2 to 3 years after the contract is signed. That is why the shipbuilding industry uses three different rulers.

New orders measure the volume of ships newly contracted that year. Deliveries measure the volume finished and handed over to owners that year. Order backlog is the work under contract that has not yet been built—a metric showing how many years of work are lined up. Depending on which of the three you choose, 'world No. 1' can point to a different country. In fact, in 2014, China led in new orders, but South Korea ranked No. 1 in actual ships delivered.

The year 2024 was even more dramatic. That year, China's market share was 70.6% by new orders, 53.3% by deliveries, and 58.1% by order backlog. All three are facts from 2024. When you see a news report claiming 'China accounts for 70% of global shipbuilding,' if you don't check which ruler was used, you are essentially reading a statement that is half wrong.

Units of measurement are not singular, either. GT measures the enclosed space inside a ship, while DWT measures how much cargo it can carry. The largest ship in history, introduced in 1979, was 564,763 DWT, yet that same vessel was also 260,941 GT. Both are called 'tons,' but what they measure is completely different. That is why the OECD established CGT in 1977 as the standard ruler for international comparisons, and revised the formula in 2007. CGT is not a measure of weight, but a converted value representing the 'amount of work' required to build the ship. Even for vessels of the same size, an LNG carrier requires far more labor than an oil tanker, so CGT is calculated by multiplying size by a coefficient for each ship type.

There is one final trap: these numbers change later on. When late-confirmed contracts come to light, statistical agencies revise past order volumes upward. Global order volume for 2024 was announced at 65.81 million CGT in early 2025, but reached 76.78 million CGT a year later. The tally for 2019 also expanded from 25.29 million CGT to 29.10 million CGT. This is why the 'market share reported in the news that year' differs from the 'market share calculated today.' Even the question of how many consecutive years South Korea held the global No. 1 spot varies by source; domestic media reports published at the same time have split between 'No. 1 for the third straight year' and 'reclaiming No. 1 after two years.'

Worth remembering Before asking 'what percentage,' ask 'measured by which ruler, and when?' Every ranking battle that follows takes place on this very foundation.

02When the Country That Built 80% of the World's Ships Started Demolishing Shipyards

In the 1890s, shipbuilding was hardly an industry where the word "competition" even belonged. Back then, Britain built about 80% of all ships launched worldwide. As of 1900, the productivity of British shipyards was 2 times that of the United States, 3 times that of Germany, and 6 times that of France. Shipbuilding was not simply an "industry Britain was good at"—it was practically "the industry Britain did."

The cracks appeared earlier than you might think. In 1913, right before World War I, Britain's market share had already slipped from 80% down into the 60% range. While figures fluctuate depending on the source, it is safest to view it as remaining between 55% and 65% throughout the 1910s and 1920s. Still, in absolute volume Britain produced more than the rest of the world combined, so people inside the country would have found it hard to call this a decline. The peak and the beginning of the slide overlapped in the very same era.

When the Great Depression arrived in 1929, shipbuilding was one of the first industries to freeze over. Ships are ordered with an eye on trade years down the road, so when the horizon turns murky, orders vanish entirely. In 1929, the unemployment rate among British shipyard workers exceeded 40%, and in 1930, only one in five shipyards received any work. The market share, which had still hovered around 60% in 1924, dropped to 50% in 1929 and fell below 40% by the mid-1930s.

Looking back now, the answer Britain came up with feels chilling. In 1930, it established an organization called National Shipbuilders Security (NSS). What this body, chaired by Sir James Lithgow, did was buy up struggling shipyards and tear them down completely. By 1938, 216 slipways (the berths where ships are built) had been dismantled. The logic was to cut excess capacity so that surviving shipyards could pull through, and it was true that there was far too much capacity at the time.

Yet equipment was not the only thing torn down. In Jarrow, in northeast England, home to the Palmers shipyard bought up and shuttered by NSS, unemployed workers marched about 300 km to London in 1936. This event became known as the Jarrow March. Britain learned back then that closing a single shipyard means the collapse of an entire town.

Even today, opinions on NSS remain divided. Some argue it was a government-backed cartel to slash output, while others contend it was unavoidable restructuring given the circumstances. Only one thing is certain: It takes only a few years to eliminate capacity, but no one has ever succeeded in bringing it back.

Worth remembering The asymmetry repeated throughout this entire story appears here for the first time: tearing down a dock and rebuilding it are by no means symmetrical.

03Britain Fell Behind Not Because It Shrank, but Because It Failed to Grow

In 1947, Britain once again built more ships than the rest of the world combined. So many vessels had been sunk during the war that anything built would sell immediately. Yet over the next 10 years, Britain's production grew by just 18%, while global output surged by 300% over the same period. Britain didn't lose the top spot because it shrank, but because it failed to grow like the others.

Why couldn't Britain expand? Boil it down to a single reason, and you're bound to get it wrong.

First, there were the construction methods. During this era, global shipbuilding was transitioning from riveting to welding, and from custom-designing every ship to repeatedly building standardized vessels. In 1954, word went around British shipyards that "shipowners don't want welded boxes; they expect plenty of rivets." Between 1950 and 1980, out of 14 major innovations, only 3 were widely adopted first in Britain. This was the very country where, over the preceding 150 years, 13 out of 15 major shipbuilding breakthroughs had originated.

Capital investment was delayed as well. As seen in the previous chapter, many slipways had already been dismantled. On top of that came troubled labor relations. The British government's 1966 Geddes Report noted that British shipyards charged an average of 20% more than foreign rivals yet were still losing money, that production management was "primitive," and that rigid union job demarcations meant it took three people—a laborer, a rigger, and an electrician—just to change a single lightbulb.

The government intervened repeatedly. Under the Shipbuilding Industry Act 1967, it consolidated 27 companies into 12 groups, pouring in 160 million pounds (£160 million) in subsidies and loans between 1967 and 1972. When even that failed, the state nationalized the sector outright on September 1, 1977. "British Shipbuilders," which bundled the surviving yards into a single corporation, held 97% of Britain's merchant shipbuilding capacity and 100% of its naval shipbuilding capacity, with 87,000 employees.

Meanwhile, in 1971, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders collapsed. When the government refused a 6-million-pound (£6 million) working-capital loan, the workers chose a "work-in" instead of a strike, staying at the yard to keep finishing the remaining ships. Jimmy Reid firmly declared there would be "no hooliganism, no vandalism, and no bevvying [drinking]," and 80,000 people rallied in Glasgow. In February 1972, the government backed down.

The end came swiftly. Between 1975 and 1985, Britain's production dropped by 90%, and its global market share fell from 3.6% to below 1%. British Shipbuilders' workforce dwindled to 5,000 by 1987, and when the last yard closed in 1989, merchant shipbuilding under state ownership came to an end. The private yards that remained didn't last long either. Belfast's Harland & Wolff, builder of the Titanic, entered administration for the second time in September 2024 and was acquired by Spanish state-owned Navantia in January 2025.

Worth remembering An industry leader never falls behind for just one reason; construction methods, capital investment, and labor relations all unraveled together.

04The Day an American Leased the Japanese Navy's Dock

As of 1948, only 20% of the ships built in Japan were joined by welding. The rest were assembled by hammering in rivets. They were in no position to look down on Britain.

Since 1947, the Japanese government had been running a system called the Planned Shipbuilding Program. Under this system, the government allocated production quotas and capital, directing which shipyard would build what kind of ship and how many. People often think state intervention in shipbuilding is a modern phenomenon, but it was already happening here. In 1950, cash flooded in from the Korean War boom, and that same year, W. Edwards Deming gave 35 lectures across Japan on statistical quality control.

Yet the breakthrough that changed the game came from an unexpected place. In 1951, a company owned by American shipowner Daniel K. Ludwig leased the former Imperial Japanese Navy's Kure shipyard for 10 years. It was the very dock where the battleship Yamato had been built. What Ludwig brought with him was the welded block construction that the United States had used to churn out Liberty ships during World War II.

Instead of assembling a ship from the bottom up piece by piece, this method divided it into several blocks, built them separately, and then welded them together inside the dock. Installing piping and electrical wiring while the sections were still separate blocks made construction vastly faster. Here is an important point to note: The United States was the one that invented this method. What Japan did was systematically adapt it to commercial merchant ships rather than warships. Hisashi Shinto, a former aircraft designer who served as chief engineer at Kure, mastered this approach, and the 4,000 to 5,000 technicians who passed through Kure later dispersed to other shipyards.

The results showed up clearly in the numbers. Between 1949 and 1956, the labor hours required to build 1 ton of a ship dropped by nearly half, and the time it took to launch a vessel shortened from 8.5 months to 6 months. Then, in 1956, Japan overtook Britain to become the world's largest builder of merchant ships. Industry leadership had changed hands for the first time.

Luck was on their side too. That same year, 1956, the Suez Canal was shut down, sparking an explosion in demand for supertankers capable of sailing all the way around Africa. In 1958, right at that Kure shipyard, the Universe Apollo—the first supertanker to exceed 100,000 DWT—was launched. Once it became clear that larger ships lowered the cost of transporting 1 ton of oil, global shipbuilding spent the next 20 years racing toward ever-larger tankers.

Japan only kept getting faster. Between 1958 and 1964, labor hours per gross ton dropped by 60%, and the steel required to build 1 ton of capacity fell by 36%. Around 1970, ships built by Japan neared half of global shipbuilding output. What had taken 10 months to launch a single cargo vessel in the late 1940s was down to 3 months, and that ship was now 10 times larger.

Worth remembering It was not the inventors, but those who transplanted the method to merchant ships, who took the lead; technological shifts always happen this quietly.

05The Country That Dug Docks the Year the World Walked Toward a Cliff

In 1967, Korea enacted the Shipbuilding Industry Promotion Act. In the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan from 1972 to 1976, shipbuilding was designated as a strategic export industry. A country that had virtually never built a ship decided to construct a massive shipyard.

In 1971, Chung Ju-yung traveled to London. He entered into technical partnerships with Britain's A&P Appledore and Scott Lithgow, and secured a shipyard construction loan from Barclays Bank. The fact that Britain stood at the starting line of Korea's shipbuilding industry is a detail that is hard to overlook.

There is a famous anecdote tied to this moment. The story goes that he showed Charles Longbottom, chairman of Appledore, the Turtle Ship on a 500-won banknote and persuaded him by saying, 'We built an ironclad ship 300 years before Britain did.' While it appears in the company's official history, it has not been verified through primary sources such as records from the British side, so it is more accurate to treat it as a frequently cited legend in the industry. As a side note, the 500-won note circulating in 1971 was issued in 1966, and the Turtle Ship on the back was modeled after folk art and had no sails. What actually clinched the loan was the technical partnership agreement and the two 260,000 DWT tankers actually ordered that year by Greek shipowner George Livanos.

The order of operations was backward. Normally, you build a shipyard first and then win ship orders, but here, they sold the ships first and built the shipyard later. In March 1972, a groundbreaking ceremony was held at Mipo Bay in Ulsan, and they had to build the shipyard and construct the ships simultaneously. The shipyard was completed in just 2 years and 3 months. In 1974, Ship No. 1, the 260,000 DWT tanker 'Atlantic Baron,' was delivered.

Around the same time, docks were being dug further south as well. In 1973, Korea Shipbuilding & Engineering Corporation broke ground on a large shipyard in Okpo, Geoje. This shipyard was handed over to Daewoo Group in 1978 and fully completed in 1981, becoming Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering, and was acquired by Hanwha in 2023 to become Hanwha Ocean. Samsung soon followed by acquiring a shipyard and establishing its presence in Geoje.

Yet in that very year of 1973, global shipbuilding was standing right at the edge of a cliff. That year, global orders for newly built ships reached an all-time high of 72.8 million GT. Then in October, the first oil shock struck. Two years later, in 1975, orders dropped to 13.8 million GT. About 81% had vanished.

The terrifying part was that it was not immediately obvious. Because ships already contracted were delivered only 2 to 3 years later, it still looked like a boom inside the shipyards for a while. While walking toward the cliff, the ground beneath their feet felt completely flat. Hyundai's Ship No. 1 was delivered after the oil shock had already arrived, and following disputes with the original buyer, Hyundai's own shipping company had to take on part of the vessels.

Worth remembering The choice to dig docks the year everyone else discovered the cliff—what that reward was will be revealed in the next chapter.

06The Country That Dug Docks When Japan Was Tearing Them Down — How Korea Became No. 1

Japan's annual launch volume, which stood at 18 million GT in 1975, fell to 4.3 million GT in 1979. In just 4 years, 76% vanished. New orders were hit even worse, plunging from about 35 million GT in 1973 to 3.65 million GT in 1978—a collapse of nearly 90%.

The Japanese government responded quickly, and its direction was the same path Britain had previously taken. In August 1978, it designated shipbuilding a 'structurally depressed industry' and decided to eliminate about 35% of all facilities capable of building vessels of 5,000 GT or larger. Starting in 1979, 61 companies took part, completing the cutbacks by March 1980. The shipbuilding workforce, including subcontractors and related industries, shrank 36.8%, dropping from 361,000 people in 1974 to 228,000 in 1979. During the very years Japan was tearing down docks, Korea was digging them.

The final scene of this period was symbolic. In 1979, Sumitomo Heavy Industries finished the vessel that would later be known as the Seawise Giant. At 564,763 DWT, it remains the largest ship in history to this day. Yet the year that ship came out was the very year the era requiring such ships came to an end.

Korea's docks were filled right after that. In 1981, Okpo Shipyard reached comprehensive completion, while Samsung completed Dock 1 in 1979 and Dock 2 in 1981. Hyundai became the world's largest shipbuilder in 1983. The fact that Korea held virtually the only brand-new facilities left where others had dismantled theirs turned into pure market share once the market returned.

There is an easy misunderstanding here. Korea did not win simply by being cheap. While low costs were certainly real, the decisive factor was that very few new docks in the world at that time could build large ships. And no country in this industry ever pulled this off alone. Korea propped up its shipyards through policy financing and equity investments from the Korea Development Bank. Japan had done so through planned shipbuilding, and Britain through subsidies followed by nationalization.

Korea first climbed to the top of the global rankings in 1999. That was based on order volume. The following year, in 2000, it took the No. 1 spot in shipbuilding completion as well. The 1-year gap comes from the time lag between signing a contract and delivering a vessel, just as we saw earlier. Looking at contemporary reports citing Lloyd's statistics, completion market share flipped from Korea's 36.8% versus Japan's 42.6% in 1999 to Korea's 40.6% versus Japan's 38.9% in 2000. Still, some compilations place the moment the trendlines crossed in 2002. Even a statement like 'Korea overtook the lead in a certain year' only holds true once you specify the metric.

Worth remembering This marks the moment global leadership changed hands for the second time. It is worth remembering that technology was not the only reason the baton was passed.

07How Did China Rise? — Meanwhile, Global Shipbuilding Was Shrinking

China's starting point came in 1975, when it exported a small ship of under 5,000 DWT. In 1982, it established the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), bringing together 26 shipyards, 66 factories, and about 300,000 workers under one roof. At that time, China ranked 16th in the world for ship exports.

Unfortunately, ship prices hit rock bottom right around that time. Between 1980 and 1986, the Clarkson Newbuilding Price Index dropped 35.7%, falling from 140 to 90. Looking at this index over the long run reveals the true nature of shipbuilding: periods of growth are short and steep, while downturns are long and gradual. It is an industry where if you decide to build a dry dock during a boom, a bust has already arrived by the time construction is finished.

China climbed steadily. In 1992, it became the world's 3rd largest merchant shipbuilding nation, and by 1996, 85% of its newly built merchant vessels were bound for export. In 1999, the government split CSSC into two entities—CSSC and CSIC—to foster mutual competition, while pushing joint ventures with foreign companies on the condition of technology transfer. In 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji publicly pledged to "become the world's number one shipbuilding nation by 2015." Shipbuilding volume, which stood at 2.5 million DWT in 2000, reached nearly 10 million DWT by 2005.

Money poured in as well. Academic studies estimate that the Chinese government injected about $90 billion in subsidies into the shipbuilding industry between 2006 and 2013, accounting for 15–20% of the cost of building a ship. We should note that this is an estimate, and that government support was never unique to China. Japan propped up its shipyards through planned shipbuilding programs, Britain through subsidies that eventually led to nationalization, and South Korea through policy financing and public funds. In no country has this industry ever been a purely private enterprise.

The moment the title changed hands was surprisingly subdued. China first overtook South Korea in order backlog in November 2009, with a margin of just 0.9 percentage points. That same year, in 2009, China rose to 1st place in new order volume, and in 2010, took 1st place in delivery volume as well. A year later, in early October 2010, the order backlog gap widened to 36.4% for China versus 32.4% for South Korea. It was not a sudden overtaking, but an erosion that unfolded over several years.

There is one backdrop here that rarely gets mentioned: While China was growing, the global shipbuilding industry itself was shrinking. Between 2010 and 2020, global shipbuilding output fell by 45%, and two-thirds of the shipyards categorized as "active" disappeared. Within China as well, the number of active shipyards dropped by 70% between 2010 and 2019. A significant portion of China's market share gain came simply because competitors closed their doors.

On November 26, 2019, China re-merged CSSC and CSIC, which it had split 20 years earlier to foster competition. This created a single shipbuilding conglomerate with $110 billion in assets and a global market share of about 20%.

Worth remembering This is the third shift. Market share doesn't just rise because you grow; it also rises when those around you disappear.

08South Korea Collapsed and Returned, but What Exactly Came Back?

The year 2014 is a milestone that must be addressed in this story. That year, South Korea once again overtook China in shipbuilding completion volume—the actual output built and handed over. South Korea recorded 12.1 million CGT, while China recorded about about 11.1 million CGT. 70% of ultra-large container ship deliveries and nearly 90% of LNG carrier deliveries came from South Korea. Yet in that very same year, China was ahead in new orders and order backlog. The fact that 'China is No. 1' and 'South Korea is No. 1' can both be true in the same year—this is the baseline reality of this industry.

And starting the following year, South Korean shipbuilding collapsed. Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME) suffered losses of about about 6 trillion won over the two years of 2015 and 2016, and received 2.9 trillion won in public bailout funds in 2017. The shipbuilding workforce plunged by more than half, falling from 203,441 people in December 2014 to 93,133 people in December 2021. Several mid-sized shipyards were liquidated or restructured as well. South Korea walked the exact path that Britain and Japan had traveled before.

Recovery came from high-value ships. According to 2019 figures announced by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy based on Clarksons data, South Korea placed No. 1 in global orders, capturing 9.43 million CGT, or 37.3%, out of the global order volume of 25.29 million CGT. China accounted for 33.8%, and Japan took 13%. In 2020, South Korea secured 8.19 million CGT, or 43%, of the 19.24 million CGT ordered worldwide. This came from sweeping 36 out of 49 large LNG carriers and 35 out of 41 VLCCs (the very large crude carriers introduced in Chapter 4).

However, it is misleading to summarize this period simply as 'No. 1 for several consecutive years.' In that same year of 2019, China was No. 1 in order backlog with 26.93 million CGT, while South Korea was second with 22.60 million CGT. Furthermore, because of retroactive data revisions, the global order total for 2019 stood at 25.29 million CGT when first published, but was later adjusted to 29.10 million CGT. As a result, domestic media reports at the time were split between 'No. 1 for the third straight year' and 'returning to No. 1 after two years.' Consecutive streak records are among the hardest figures to verify in this industry.

In 2019, Hyundai Heavy Industries sought to acquire Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering and created the holding company Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering (KSOE), but the European Commission vetoed the deal, citing concerns over a monopoly in the LNG carrier market (the exact timing of the ruling is recorded differently across sources, falling between late 2021 and early 2022). Hanwha ultimately acquired DSME in 2023, renaming it Hanwha Ocean. The reality that virtually all the world's LNG carriers are built by just a few yards in South Korea effectively served as the grounds for blocking a domestic merger within that country.

It is necessary to separate what returned from what did not. The shipbuilding industry's combined operating profit swung from a deficit of 4.70 trillion won in 2021 to a surplus of 2.17 trillion won in 2024. The workforce also recovered to 125,636 people by December 2024. But that is still far from the previous 200,000 people. Meanwhile, the share of subcontracted workers among skilled production labor rose from 67% in 2020 to 74% in 2024, and about 20% of the entire workforce consists of foreign workers. And in the single year of 2024, 24 people died across 20 industrial accidents in this industry.

Worth remembering Work has returned, but the composition of the workforce has changed—a reality that must be weighed alongside any talk of a boom.

09How to Read Shipbuilding News in 2026

Let's first examine the current landscape using the full year of 2024. Out of 65.81 million CGT in global new orders, China took 46.45 million CGT, or 70.6%. South Korea secured 10.98 million CGT, or 16.7%, while Japan recorded 3.24 million CGT, or 4.9%. Yet when looking at actual delivery shares—ships built and handed over in that same year—China stood at 53.3%, South Korea at 27.9%, and Japan at 12.0%. Change the ruler, and the gap shrinks by half. In terms of order backlog, China held 58.1%, South Korea 23.8%, and Japan 8.2%. For context, that 65.81 million CGT was the preliminary figure announced in early 2025. In the tally compiled one year later, it grew to 76.78 million CGT, and whenever the total volume shifts, the market shares calculated on top of it fluctuate as well.

This is where it is tempting to write off Japan as "finished." Its share of new order volume dropped to single digits, falling behind even the European Union (6%). Depending on the tally, this same metric for the same year is cited as either 4% or 4.9%, but either way, it remains below the EU. This was the consequence after Sumitomo Heavy Industries stepped away from commercial shipbuilding, following Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, Mitsui Shipbuilding, and Sasebo Heavy Industries. Yet in terms of deliveries that same year, Japan was still third at 12.0%. You should never write off an entire country based on a single metric.

You also have to consider that these figures swing wildly from year to year. In the finalized annual tallies for 2025, global orders totaled 56.43 million CGT, with China taking 63% and South Korea 21%. South Korea's own order volume grew by 8% over the previous year, while China's dropped by 35%. Yet looking at cumulative data from January to August 2026, the balance tilted right back to 76% for China and 16% for South Korea.

This brings us to the most common misunderstanding. A decline in market share is not the same as a decline in volume. From January to August 2026, South Korea's own order volume actually increased by 55% compared to the same period the previous year. Its share fell simply because China's volume surged by 95%. Looking at a single month makes the numbers swing even more. In August 2026, South Korea's monthly market share fell to 7%, its lowest point of the year, but just three months earlier in May, it stood at 31%. Reading a single month's figures as a country's year-round capability will inevitably lead you astray.

Ship prices point in another direction entirely. The Clarksons Newbuilding Price Index hovered near its peak at 186.34 in late August 2026. A single LNG carrier was priced at around $248.5 million. It is a divergent phase where South Korea's order share declines while vessel prices remain elevated. In the first half of 2026, the average order size per vessel was 38,000 CGT for South Korea and 26,000 CGT for China, showing that South Korea maintained its structure of selectively taking larger and higher-priced ships.

The other face of that structure is concentration. As of the end of 2024, gas carriers accounted for 60.7% of South Korean shipyards' order backlog, while bulk carriers stood at 0%. That is both a strength and a risk. Meanwhile, China's Hudong-Zhonghua expanded its annual LNG carrier deliveries from 6 ships in 2023 to 7 ships in 2024 and 11 ships in 2025, shortening the build time for the lead ship of a series to 24–30 months. South Korea's construction period is 30–33 months, so the gap is no longer wide. However, China's LNG carrier track record and backlog are still concentrated in projects backed by domestic capital, meaning open-market competition is only just beginning.

Finally, there is the customer base. In 2024, 91.3% of orders placed by Chinese shipping lines went to Chinese shipyards. For South Korea, domestic orders accounted for only 24.3%. A substantial part of Chinese shipbuilding's strength comes from its massive domestic clientele, whereas South Korean shipbuilding's performance is almost entirely driven by exports.

Worth remembering To read a single headline about shipbuilding, you need six things: the metric, the time frame, the difference between volume and market share, ship prices, vessel types, and the customer.

10What to Watch When the Next Round Begins

Forecasting the future isn't what this story is meant to do. Instead, guided by the rules we've seen so far, I'll point out just four places to watch so you can spot the tide turning first.

The first is the United States. On October 14, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative began levying port fees on vessels built in China or owned and operated by China. However, its implementation was suspended for one year starting November 10—until November 9, 2026. With this single move, the market initially redirected orders, only to return to a wait-and-see stance. What happens the day the suspension lifts is not something this story can answer. But the very fact that politics can redraw the map of this industry has already been confirmed.

Along the same lines, South Korea is building shipyards right in the United States. Hanwha acquired Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia for $100 million in December 2024, and in August 2025 announced an additional $5 billion investment to expand its annual building capacity from fewer than 2 vessels to up to 20 vessels. The delivery target for its first MR tanker (medium-range product tanker) is early 2029. On July 23, 2026, the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Cooperation Center opened in Washington, launching the $150 billion MASGA project. But here is where we must be careful: $100 million is actual capital already spent on an acquisition, $5 billion is an announced plan, and $150 billion is a pledged figure. Three numbers with very different weights should never be lumped onto the same line.

Next is fuel. In its 2023 greenhouse gas strategy, the International Maritime Organization set a target to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping by around 2050. Deciding what fuel will power future ships has become the next battleground for shipyards. Yet no clear standard has been set. As of the end of 2025, the global order backlog for alternative-fuel-capable ships stood at 1,942 vessels, but new orders for methanol fell from 149 vessels in 2024 to 61 vessels in 2025, with LNG once again taking the lead. Which fuel will prevail remains entirely up in the air.

We must also watch Japan. On January 6, 2026, Imabari Shipbuilding finalized the process of raising its stake in the No. 2 builder, JMU, to 60%, absorbing it as a subsidiary. Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism has presented a roadmap to consolidate its domestic shipbuilding industry into one to three groups by the mid-2030s. The country still holding third place in shipbuilding volume is making its final push to join forces.

And perhaps the most critical place to watch is the cycle. Looking at the Clarkson Newbuilding Price Index since 1980, the ups and downs repeat across six phases: the booms are short and steep, while the busts are long and gradual. Right now, prices are near their peak. Let's make one thing clear: Leadership didn't change hands only during downturns. When Japan surpassed Britain in 1956, it was right in the middle of a boom, as the closure of the Suez Canal triggered a sudden explosion in demand for supertankers. What is certain, however, is this: when prices tumble and backlogs dry up, the game is decided by who preserves their docks and who dismantles them. Both Britain and Japan scrapped their capacity during those slumps, and the players that kept their facilities intact claimed the lion's share of the next boom.

Finally, just one more thing. In November 2025, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries delivered its 5,000th vessel—a world first. It came 51 years after its Hull No. 1 in 1974. Meanwhile, the symbolic shipyard of the very country that supplied the capital and technology to build that first ship was sold off to a Spanish state-owned enterprise in 2025. That is how leadership in this industry has always moved.

Worth remembering This isn't about predicting the future, but knowing where to watch: American regulations, fuel standards, Japan's consolidation, and the day ship prices finally turn.